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PROPERTY RIGHTS, REGULATORY REGIMES
AND THE NEW TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE-
AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
CAROL M. ROSE·
The year 1991 will mark the sixty-fifth birthday of one of the
Supreme Court's watershed tests of regulatory authority over landed
property; That test, which is set forth in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 1 established the legitimacy of local zoning. At the outset,
Euclid was something of a cliffhanger; the Court's majority was
convinced only at the last minute of the propriety of local zoning
regulations. But cliffhanger or not, localities since that decision have
relied on Euclid as the central authority for a wide range of controls
on private land development2-and as a protective screen against the
charge that their regulations illegitimately take away the property
rights of regulated landowners.
Perhaps because the case was about land, however, and perhaps
because land is such a tangible form of property, Euclid has had an
important role as a negative symbol as well. Euclid has acted as a
kind of lightning rod for those who contest what they perceive as
unwarranted governmental intrusion on private property rights. This
has particularly been true in recent years. As advocates of private
property have enjoyed a certain philosophical and popular revival,
they have also put Euclid under siege, precisely because the case
appeared to legitimate some of the most visible regulation of prop-
erty. Thus, the old case's embattlement has created some opportu-
nities to reassess not only the role that we assign to property rights,
but also the role we expect from property regulation. In this article,
I hope to contribute to that reassessment. My argument is that
property on the one hand, and the regulation of property on the
• Johnston Professor of Property and Environmental Law, Yale University.
This article is drawn from her presentation delivered as the Fourteenth Annual
Alumni Distinguished Lecture in Jurisprudence on March 9, 1990 at the College of
Law, University of Tennessee at Knoxville.
1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. Euclid was especially notable because it followed, by only a few years,
another landmark case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
which had overturned, as a regulatory "taking" of property, a Pennsylvania statute
that attempted to restrain land subsidence due to mining.
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other, are aligned in a set of overlapping evolutionary relationships.
1. Euclid and the Challenge of the New Takings Cases
Until the past decade, a generous reading of Euclid prevailed in
the most important land use cases. Indeed, for forty years after
Euclid, the United States Supreme Court refused to hear the claims
of the aggrieved landowners who raised "takings" charges against
the promulgators of local zoning regulations. 3 In spite of Euclid's
remarkable vigor, however, the decade leading up to the case's sixty-
fifth anniversary has been marked by some grumbling that the case
has reached retirement age4-and with it, the post-Euclidean prolif-
eration of far-reaching local land controls that are indeed the true
target of the efforts to reverse, or at least narrow, Euclid's reach.~
Some have said that. zoning and land use controls symbolize an
intolerable infringement on the natural and just reach of a landown-
er's property rights, rights that our Constitution was designed to
safeguard. To the guarded applause of such critics,6 the Supreme
Court finally has begun to consider seriously some takings charges
based on land use controls,? and to suggest that some of Euclid's
3. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVEL-
OPMENT CONTROL LAW 41-42, 46 (2d ed. 1986).
4. See, e.g., R. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 131-33 (1985) (Euclid reasoning unpersuasive); Siegan, Editor's
Introduction: The Anomaly of Regulation Under the Taking Clause, in PLANNING
WITHOUT PRICES: THE TAKING CLAUSE AS IT RELATES TO LAND USE REGULATION
WITHOUT COMPENSATION 36 (B. Siegan ed. 1977) (Euclid case should be reconsidered);
United States President's Commission on Housing, Report of the President's Com-
mission on Housing 202 (1982) (same); see also Delogu, Rethinking Zoning, 38
LAND USE LAW & ZoNING DIG., March 1986, at 3, col. 1 (critics of zoning on the
offensive; apologists have the burden of persuasion); Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning,
31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 719 (1980) (attack on zoning as anachronistic, from author
sympathetic to other types of land regulation).
5. See, e.g., Kmiec, Protecting Vital and Pressing Governmental Interests-
A Proposal for a New Zoning Enabling Act, 30 J. URB. & CONTEMP. LAW 19, 24-
26 (1986); United States President's Commission on Housing, supra note 4, at 201·
02.
6. See, e.g., Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court
Establishes New Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735, 756-57,
781 (1988) (approves of constitutional protection of property rights, but Berger
thinks standards remain too vague); Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection,
1987 SUP. CT. REv. 1 (same); Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking
Clause is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1648 (1988) (discussing
the author's own mixed reaction to Nollan case).
7. Prior to the 1987 cases, the Supreme Court signalled a hesitant but
growing interest in takings cases by granting certiorari to several cases and then
avoiding a decision on the merits by ruling on procedural grounds. See Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S.
172 (1985); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986);
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modern permutations might so infringe private property as to require
compensation. While not all the new Supreme Court takings cases
have satisfied Euclid's critics,8 at least some cases appear to promise
a new stringency in reviewing local zoning regulations. Leading off
this group was the 1982 case Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corporation,9 which found a "taking" of property in a
regulation requiring a building owner to accept the minor intrusion
of cable wiring equipment on the roof. The case indicated that the
Court would revive at least one traditional takings test 10 and closely
scrutinize regulations that physically invade landed property, no
matter how slight the intrusion.
A second and more innovative case was one of several 1987
takings cases. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church oj Glendale
v. Los Angeles ll established that if an owner suc~eeds in a takings
claim, damages will be an available remedy against the regulating
body, even if the harm is only a temporary taking of property.
A third, and probably the most significant case, was another
1987 decision, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,J2 in which
an owner successfully contested a California agency's refusal to grant
a building permit for a beachfront house. The agency had conditioned
the permit on the owner's grant of what was essentially a public
easement over the waterfront end of his property. The Nollan ma-
jority rejected this condition as an uncompensated taking of property.
Nollan may be read merely as a straightforward application of
the older taboo against "physically invasive" land regulations,13 but
the case might also be read much more broadly in one of two ways.
First, it might be read as a use of takings doctrine to restrain any
land use regulation, whether physically invasive or not, from imposing
conditions on development that are unrelated to problems that the
development itself creates. Second, taken even more generally, the
case might be read as a signal that the courts should give something
more than cursory attention to purported "takings" of propertyY
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (all avoiding compensation issue on procedural
or "ripeness" grounds).
8. One case, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987) appeared particularly problematic because it upheld a state mining statute
very much like the statute that the old Pennsylvania Coal Co. case had overturned
as a taking of property.
9. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
10. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427-35. For the classic "physical invasion" test, see
Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1872).
11. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
12. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
13. See, e.g., Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 16()7-Q8
(1988) (focusing on physical invasion aspects of Nollan, disputing broader reading).
14. On the issue of the stringency of review in' takings cases, see the debate
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Thus, these new decisions may appear to inch toward a vindi-
cation of those. who regard much modern land use regulation as an
. infringement on the historic rights stemming from property owner-
ship. Henceforth, I will refer to this view as the "property rights
position," and it is perhaps most noticeably represented in the work
of Bernard Siegan and Richard Epstein. ls The property rights position
often has a libertarian flavor which attempts to ground the position
ona tradition-sometimes traced to John Locke-in which property
rights are held to be central to the liberty and independence of
individuals. 16 With respect to Constitutional interpretation, the prop-
erty rights position generally argues that American law during the
founding period was dominated by a strong commitment to the rights
of individuals to hold property, that this commitment continued
roughly until the end of the nineteenth century, and that it accorded .
to property rights a protection against governmental encroachment
that was at least equal to the protection given other kinds of
individual rights. 17 Euclid, however, departed from that tradition in
permitting a wide range of local land controls. IS Euclid's famous
cousin, the 1938 Carolene Products case, marked the nadir in this
development by suggesting that property rights were poor relations
in the world of rights and, as such, much more subject to govern-
mental intrusion than the rights that more directly safeguard political
liberty and equality to insulated minority groups.19
In a recent paper, the political scientist Dennis Coyle has described
the twentieth century land use cases as part of what he and others
call a "double standard" in the Constitutional treatment of rights-
a standard that gives property rights a lower status than other rights. 20
But he also argues that the new takings cases, such as Nollan, have
emerged from a paradoxical development: the very concerns for
liberty and equality, which initially created the double standard in
rights analysis, have eroded the double standard itself. Realistically,
between Scalia for the majority and Brennan in ·dissent. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834
n.3 (Scalia, J.) and 842-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15. See R. EpSTEIN, supra note 4, and Siegan, supra note 4.
16. See R. EpSTEIN, supra note 4, at 9-15. Epstein believes that his Lockeanism
has been misunderstood by some commentators. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 2-3
n.5.
17. See, e.g., Houle, Eminent Domain, Police Power, and Business Regula-
tion: Economic Liberty and the Constitution, 92 W. VA. L. REv. 51, 54-58 (1989).
18. R. EpSTEIN, supra note 15, at 132-33 (Euclid), 266-73 (later zoning cases).
19. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); for
a comment from the property rights perspective, see Berger, supra note 6, at 752-
55.
20. D. COYLE, THE CIRCLE UNBROKEN: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ECLIPSE
OF THE DOUBLE STANDARD (typescript, 1989); see also Funston, The Double Standard
of Constitutional Protection in the Era of the Welfare State, 90 POL. SCI. Q. 261
(1975).
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regulatory intrusions on property rights have serious detrimental
implications for liberty and equality, just as regulatory intrusions on
other rights do. Professor Coyle argues that the courts have haltingly
come to recognize this point, and thus the new takings cases would·
appear to signal a limited return toa more vigorous protection of
private property rights. 21 Hence, the new takings cases garner some
applause from proponents of the "property rights" position.
This resurgence of the property rights position, however, has
roused considerable consternation in some other land use quarters. 22
In particular, the Court's newfound willingness to find at least some
regulatory "takings," coupled with the Court's assent to a damage
remedy for those takings, has raised a specter that governmental
agenices might be intimidated, and their members might be frightened
away from their just and proper authority in regulating the use of
property. Some commentators have attempted to exercise a certain
"spin control" on the new takings cases by arguing that they will
have little practical effect.23 Others note the uncertainties of takings
law and the chilling effects that potentially high damage awards may
have on apprehensive would-be regulators.24 Such commentators fear
the possibility that newly emboldened developers may destroy the
landscape and inflict immense damage on the public, while our
cowed, overcautious officials refrain from imposing regulations that
might otherwise properly restrain depredations on our communities.2s
These commentators, whatever their specific reading on the new
takings cases, generally accept land use regulation as a proper role
for government. I will' refer to their views as the "regulatory posi-
tion."
The property rights position and the regulatory position provide
two quite sharply divergent reactions to the new takings cases, and
21. Professor Coyle also identifies a second strand of judicial opinions that
merely tries to fine-tune the double standard by incorporating egalitarian and
libertarian concerns in such matters as the "exclusionary" effect of certain zoning
regulations, infringement on free speech in the zoning treatment of adult movie
theaters, and the like; the fine-tuning itself, however, seems merely to complicate
property rights even further.
22. For an interpretation of the new takings cases as part of a resurgent
property rights position, see Williams, Legal Discourse, Social Vision and the
Supreme Court's Land Use Planning Law: The Genealogy of the Lochnerian
Recurrence in First English Lutheran Church and No//an, 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 427
(1988).
23. See, e.g., Michelman supra note 13 (No//an case falls into traditional
"physical invasion" category); Callies, Property Rights: Are There Any Left?, 20
UllB. LAW 597, 627-32, 641-43 (1988) (new cases unlikely to have major effect on
takings decisions).
24. See, e.g., Mixon, Compensation Claims Against Local Governments for
Excessive Land-Use Regulations: A Proposal for More Efficient State Level Adju-
dication, 20 UllB. LAW 675, 686 (1988).
25. Mixon, supra note 24, at 686.
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they thus raise an opportunity to reconsider property and regulation
from two different perspectives. First, the property rights position
invites us to consider what historic property rights were supposed to
accomplish. Second, the regulatory position leads us to ask what
public limitations on property rights were supposed to accomplish. I
will develop takings and related property issues from these' two
perspectives and synthesize them into a broader evolutionary per-
spective that encompasses both property rights and regulatory re-
gimes.
2. The Purposes of a Property Regime
The purpose of a property regime is an issue that need not
necessarily be dealt with historically, but because much of the prop-
erty rights position appears to rest on an understanding of the
founders' view of property, I will address that question briefly. The
property rights position generally ascribes to the founders a libertarian
attitude about property. The founders, it is said, thought that prop-
erty itself may predate the governments that are themselves designed
to protect property. Furthermore, whatever the chronological prior-
ities between property and government, the founders are supposed
to have thought that the law of property is an institution through
which a rightly-ordered regime assures a domain of autonomy and
individuality in the 'citizenry. 26
No doubt, some of the founders did have this autonomy-protec-
tion function in mind. A famous quotation from James Madison,
equating a wide variety of liberties and other good things with
property, suggests that he believed the term "property" could be
applied to rights generally. 27 In their insistence on protecting private
property, however, some of the founders had an additional goal in
mind as well: the goal of making America wealthy and, therefore,
strong.28 This is also a way of protecting autonomy, but it is
autonomy as a collectivity; this goal represents a type of foreign
policy objective-and foreign policy was a matter that was of great
importance to eighteenth century American statesmen.29
26. See, e.g. R. EpSTEIN, supra note 4, at 17; Siegan, supra note 4, at 22;
Houle, supra note 17, at 54-58.
27. J. MADISON, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 14
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (R. Rutland et aI. eds. 1983) (land, merchandise,
and money are property, but "in its larger and juster meaning" the term also
includes "everything to which a man may attach a value and have a right," e.g.
opinions, religious beliefs, personal safety, etc.).
28. See Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-
Federalism from the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L.
REV. 74, 86-88 (1989).
29. See, e.g., G. STROURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REpUB-
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How can property rights serve the ends of national wealth and
strength? They do so through incentives. In a regime of well-secured
property, owners can reap the rewards of their investment and
industry. The property regime encourages owners to devote their
energy and time to locating valuable resources and making those
resources more valuable. Such a property regime also permits owners
to trade their possessions freely, and this also encourages the move-
ment of resources into the hands of those who value them most. To
use a common phrase,30 the total "pie" is larger if private property
is safeguarded. This is because a property regime encourages the
individual industry that produces wealth-especially if all these in-
dustrious folk can trade freely over a wide and unimpeded market.
Moreover, as students of Leo Strauss have often pointed out in their
discussion of the founding period, once involved in trade and com-
merce, the citizenry is likely to discover that the pleasures of acqui-
sition are superior to the wasteful pleasures of quarreling over
possession of a particular piece of property, or over religion or the
multiplicity of other subjects upon which proud and otherwise un-
occupied people may feud. 31 Derivatively, the nation as a whole is
wealthier and stronger because the tax base of propertied and pros-
perous citizens becomes larger, and because the citizens are contented
and not fractious.
In these ways, a property regime uses indirect means to make
the nation stronger. This political use of property diverges markedly
from the more direct, command-and-control efforts proposed by the
seventeenth century cameralist/mercantilist thinkers. John Locke un-
derstood the cumulative, political potential of private property; as
he said, that "wise and godlike" prince who secured his subjects'
property would "quickly be too hard for his neighbors."32 Some of
the eighteenth century's so-called enlightened monarchs adopted this
idea too-as did Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. After all,
Hamilton and Madison had read the property theorists of the Scottish
Enlightenment, including Adam Smith.33 More recently, of course,
some of the leaders of twentieth century socialist countries also have
learned the lesson that the protection of private property and trade
UCAN GOVERNMENT 127-30, 142-45 (1977) (Hamilton's views of importance of wealth,
unity for strength); LaFeber, The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy,
74 J. AM. HIST. 695, 695-96 (1987) (founders' attentiveness to foreign policy
consideration,s of domestic policy); see also Rose, supra note 28, at 88.
30. See, e.g., R. EpSTEIN, supra note 4, at 3-6.
31. M. DIAMOND, The Federalist, in HISTORY OF POLmCAL PHILOSOPHY 631,
648-49 (S. Strauss & Cropsey, 2d ed. 1972).
32. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GoVERNMENT § 43.
33. F. McDONALD, Noyus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION 128 (1985) (Smith's Wealth of Nations, well-known in America,
was read and used by Madison and Hamilton).
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may enhance the national wealth substantially more than does direct
command and control. Whatever the distributional problems of pri-
vate property regimes, the command-and-control reginies often come
to preside over impoverished and discouraged citizenries. While such
regimes repress market allocations for the sake of greater productivity
and a more equal distribution of goods, we have learned that they
may in fact repress productivity, and they may not necessarily even
be egalitarian. Instead, they may pass out their meager goods through
political favoritism. 34
The point of all this is that a property regime has a political goal
that is independent of the goal of preserving individual autonomy.
. That political goal is the production of wealth and, through wealth,
national strength-a concept that our founding fathers understood.
Even Madison's famous assimilation of all rights into property rights
may have to be understood metaphorically. One of the normal
attributes of common-law property is the right of disposal and sale,
but Madison almost certainly did not believe that people should be
able to sell their religious views and their political rights. Clearly,
however, he did believe that people should be allowed to sell their
lands, their goods and their services to the highest bidder throughout
the extent of a large commercial republic. This would transform the
weak and fragmented Confederation into an empire that could repel
any depredations from foreign powers. And it has, has it not?
Perhaps it has, much more than Madison and Hamilton could have
dreamed, or than some of their contemporaries would have even
wanted. 3s
3. Scarcity, Externality, and Regulation
If the property rights position raises the question, "What good
can a property regime produce?," the regulatory position raises
another question; namely, what is the regulation of property supposed
to accomplish? I propose to approach this question by inquiring into
the relationship between property regimes and scarcity.
Property regimes are a means of managing conflicts over scarce
resources. As commentators from William Blackstone36 through Ri-
34. See, e.g., Schuemann, East German Marchers Demand Reunification and
End to Party, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1989, p. I, col. 3 (East Germans' fury upon
learning about wealth and privileges enjoyed by socialist governmental and party
leaders).
35. See, e.g., the complaints of the Antifederalists that the Federalists were
attempting to create a country geared to empire and war, rather than to the flowering
of individual liberty, cited in Rose, supra note 28, at 89 n.64, 93.
36. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 3-4 (ed.
1979).
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chard Posner37 have noted, there is no reason to have property rights
where there is an abundance of everything for everyone. Property
rights are defined when there is a scarcity of something. When we
have the good sense to create property rights in scarce goods, these
rights help us to shift ownership of goods by trading them instead
of fighting over them. Just as important, because property rights
reward' those who create desired goods, they also help to alleviate
the scarcity itself. But we do not concern ourselves with property
rights when a lot of something is available. We do not need them
then, except perhaps as a framework to use to settle occasional
localized conflicts.38
Historically, too, the use of property has tended to be loose and
unconstrained as long as there is no scarcity of a given resource.
Some writers on the "takings" clause have gleefully pointed out that
although the statesmen of the early republic may have spoken much
about the sacredness of property rights, early nineteenth century state
governments often felt' free to take undeveloped property for roads
and other public projects without paying compensation to the own-
ers.39 That practice appears odd at first blush, but it really is not so
amazing, considering that a great deal of undeveloped land was
available, and that many landowners may not have believed that the
expense of compensating as a general practice was worth the effort. 40
Only when land became more scarce and more valuable did we begin
to hear more focused arguments about "takings." In the same
pattern, private property owners took many liberties as well, and no
one cared. For a long time, for example, factories dumped smoke
into the air at will, effectively appropriating the airspace of their
neighbors. Economists call this type of invasion an "externality,"
using up or appropriating something "external" to whatever an owner
of property has bargained and paid for. But who cares, if nobody
else is actually using the neighboring air?
37. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 33 (3d ed. 1986).
38. See Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law
Water Rights, 19 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 261, 270-73 (1990) (unexpectedly rigid rhetoric
about rights sometimes appears in conditions of plenty, as a baseline to settle
localized conflicts or extreme behavior).
39. See M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860
63-64 (1977) (uncompensated taking of undeveloped land in the early nineteenth
century was sometimes based on a theory ·of "reservation" for public uses); F.
BoSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKINGS ISSUE 105-114 (1975) (same).
40. This could be attributable to a utilitarian calculus, as interpreted by Frank
Michelman's famous formulation: demoralization costs may have been very low if
more land were readily available, while settlement costs might have been high-a
possible recipe for non-compensation. See Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L.
REv. 1165, 1214-15 (1967).
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Who cares? Somebody cares if she does want to use the neigh-
boring air. If she buys the air-polluted 10t, for example, and she
wants to establish an apartment complex there, she will care about
neighboring air pollution.41 In general, somebody is likely to care
about externalities whenever and wherever resource uses become more
intense. That is, externalities tend to matter more when competition
for the resource is sharper. In the law of air pollution, for example,
densely populated London put restraints on coal-burning as early as
the thirteenth century.42 In the United States, the common law of
the later nineteenth century responded to the externalities of air
pollution with nuisance law, a post hoc order to owners to use their
property "reasonably" with respect to their neighbors and to avoid
inflicting upon them more than a normally understood and normally
accepted modicum of harm.
Nuisance is a vague way of defining externalities and forcing
their creators to "internalize" them. Contemporary commentators
envisioned the early twentieth century's land use regulations as a
method to handle externality problems more precisely by defining
potential problems in advance and preventing them from arising in
the first place.43 Predictably, these more exacting land use regulations
arrived as more dense land uses created greater competition for
development opportunities, especially in urban areas. 44 .Among the
precipitating events for New York's first zoning ordinance, for ex-
ample, was the construction of skyscrapers, partiCularly the bulky
Equitable Building, which was completed in 1914, and which was
considered mammoth by contemporary New Yorkers. These new tall
buildings elicited an outcry from nearby property owners who thought
that the new buildings were adding to street congestion, usurping
their light and air, and grossly devaluing their property.4S Although
they did not express the idea in these words, they thought that these
structures imposed some unpaid-for externalities on them.
41. For a famous example of a similar occurrence, see Spur Indus., Inc. v.
Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972) (conflict between a new
retirement community and an established feedlot over the latter's odors and flies).
42. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. D. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION: LAW AND POLICY 128 (1st ed. 1984).
43. See Baker, Zoning Legislation, 11 CORNELL L. REv. 164, 165-69 (1926)
(unplanned uses were often incompatible and caused harm to each other); Young,
City Planning and Restrictions on Property, 9 MINN. L. REv. 518 (1925) (citing
lack of coordination in urban growth).
44. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 43; Young, supra note 43 (citing rapid
urbanization as bringing about the need for city planning and regulation).
45. See generally S. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 145-55, 162-66 (1969); see also
Baker, supra note 43, at 167 (noting that skyscrapers generally covered whole blocks,
and that their "upper stories use light and air that properly belong to neighboring
landowners").
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In general, the rationale for zoning and other land use controls
has been the control of externalities. We should not be astonished
that these regulations evolved in the direction of more detail and
greater stringency as our land uses became more intense, and as we
noticed th~t our previously free-and-easy ways might impose some
tangible harm on neighbors. True, some of us may indeed have
become accustomed to our free-and-easy ways with our property, to
the extent that we believe that we have rights to continue these uses
regardless of other people's concerns. Indeed, libertarian thinkers
may convince us that regulatory limits violate our rights as owners.
How the rights argument cuts is not clear, however. Whose rights
are violated if a neighbor burns his old tires in the backyard, or
plays his stereo at full volume? Who has a right to what?
The answer to this question depends on one's definition of rights,
but until scarcity and more intense use confronts us with competition
over 'land uses we have not normally bothered to define 'rights in
those areas at all. Why should we be surprised if we ask our
regulatory regime to do so, when the time arrives when our previously
nonconflicting uses start to compete? Perhaps it never occurred to
us, for example, that anyone might be injured by letting the trees
around our residences grow tall. In an age of overh.ead wires (and
solar collectors), however, we might start to wonder, and we might
be better off as a community if our regulatory regime gave us some
guidance.46 Some regulation may be necessary even though we might
want to make adjustments for individual owners who are adversely
affected by changes in the regulations.47
4. A Synthesis of Property and Regulatory Regimes: the
Evolutionary Approach
One can assimilate these two sets of observations by pointing out
that if private property historically had overall wealth enhancement
as a goal, so too did the regulation of externalies. By defining and
regulating externalities, we try to ensure that people will consider
46. For the relatively recent legal activity in redefining solar rights, see, e.g.,
Bradbrook, Future Directions in Solar Access Protection, 19 ENVTL. L. L67 (1988);
Eisenstadt, Access to Solar Energy: The Problem and its Current Status, \22 NAT.
REs. J. 21 (1982); for this and wind access, see Bradbrook, Australian and American
Perspectives on the Protection of Solar and Wind Access, 28 NAT. REs. J. 229
(1988).
47. For this reason, for example, zoning laws generally have a category of
'~pre-existing nonconforming uses" to permit some continuation of pre-regulatory
structures. Subsequent efforts to stop such uses, however, can cause conflicts. See,
e.g., the "amortization" scheme in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26
Cal.3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 453
U.S. 490 (1981).
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carefully the resources they use, instead of recklessly consuming
resources in ways that can harm others or lead to conflict and waste.
Moreover, with increasing development and competition for land, we
should expect a more refined regulatory attention to the various
aspects of land usage because as land resources become scarcer, the
interactions of land usages become more noticeable and more im-
portant. This is one way to read the history of American landed
property and its regulation. As land resources became more devel-
oped, we progressed from a regime of "anything goes" with one's
landed property, to a regime of post hoc judicial control on "nuis-
ances," to a regime of legislatively defined, ex ante regulation.
I do not mean to suggest that every regulatory regime is perfect,
or that our regulators always adhere strictly to a program of defining
and managing externalities-far from it. First, planners are not
always sensible about their proposals for land use regulations, some-
times because they attempt to plan before anyone knows what
developments might be in demand, or what external effects that
might actually occur.48 Second, regulators may be overly sensitive to
the home folks and to "insiders" at the expense of "outsiders."
When that is the case, they may pass regulations that place undue
obstacles in the way of locally unwanted land uses-or locally un-
wanted newcomers who wish to enter a community and get fair
treatment there.49
For a third and related matter, a regulatory regime is likely to
present some opportunities for what is now called rent-seeking, or
perhaps more bluntly, extortion.50 It is well-known that land use
control offers many opportunities for corruption. 51 Even assuming
that we discount the element of graft, we can still observe that land
48. For a critique of the abstract advance plan, from the perspective of the
more recent "rolling" planning doctrine, see Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal
Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 837, 873-78
(1983); see also Krasnowiecki, supra note 4. A revealing newspaper headline about
advanced planning appeared in the Chicago Tribune a few years ago: Mayor's New
Goals Run from A to B by Way of Zuz, Chicago Tribune, Sept. I, 1987, sec. 2,
at 3, col. I (describing major planning report as "larded with pious generalities").
49. A major controversy of the last two decades has been the "exclusionary"
land use regulations that raise the price of housing beyond the means of lower
income residents. New Jersey's courts have led an effort to overcome these. For a
recent description of the somewhat ambiguous results, see Lamar, Malach & Payne,
Mount Laurel at Work: Affordable Housing in New Jersey, 1983-1988,41 RUTGERS
L. REv. 1197 (1989). Even ostensibly well-meaning regulations may have exclusionary
effects. See, e.g., Ellickson, The Irony of "Inc/usionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1167 (1981).
50. See generally J. BUCHANAN, R. TOLLISON & G. TuLLOCK, TOWARD A
THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (1980).
51. See J. GETZELS & C. THUROW, AN ANALYSIS OF ZONING REFORMS:
MINIMIZING THE INCENTIVE FOR CORRUPTION (Nat'l I~st. of Law Enforcement &
CriIninal Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice 1979).
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use regulation sometimes has been used as a way to extort public
services from new development. The Nollan case provides an example,
where the owner could not get a building permit unless he gave a
right-of-way for public access across his beachfront. This type of
activity amounts to a special tax on a very narrow tax base-the
people who want to do something new with their land. While this
special tax may be attractive to politicians who hate to propose
general taxes, upon reflection, many of us might not believe the
regulation is proper.52 The property rights position might view the
tax as a violation of a right; many other people would use the phrase
"unfair" (because it is imposed only on a few); and a coldblooded
economic calculator would view this kind of regulation as an inef-
ficient disincentive to innovation and a distortion of the market for
new development generally. Again, the increasing intensity of land
use is likely to make us more aware of regulatory deficiencies of this
sort.
The key point is that regulatory regimes have an evolution, too.
In many ways, the evolution of regulatory regimes replicates, at a
meta-level, the evolution ofprivate property regimes. Just as we used
to say, "anything goes" about private land uses, and just as 'private
landowners became accustomed to uncontrolled use of their land, we
have also gone through a period when we said "anything goes" for
the regulation of private land uses. During this time, land use
regulators became accustomed to believing that they were entitled to
regulate anything that they pleased under the auspices of Euclidean
zoning.53 But with an increasing scarcity of land resources, we do
not need just any regulatory regime; we need a good one. We need
a regulatory regime that helps us to internalize externalities-a reg-
ulatory regime that induces us to think carefully about the 'way we
use land, without distorting our decision-making process or diverting
us from activities that are worthwhile and valuable.
This brings us back to a reconsideration of the recent Supreme
Court takings decisions. These decisions might be viewed as a move
52. See, e.g., F. JAMES & D. GALE, ZONING FOR SALE 31-34 (1977) (analogizes
development exactions to tax, levied on narrow tax base and giving land issues
presumed priority to other public uses of funds).
53. For the term "anything goes" explicitly applied to review of land use
regulation, see Siemon, The Paradox of 'In Accordance With a Comprehensive
Plan' and Post Hoc Rationalizations: The Need for Efficient and Effective Judicial
Review of Land Use Regulations, 16 STETSON L. REv. 603, 605-606 (1987). For
, some examples of the wide-ranging uses of zoning for a variety of purposes, see
Wilson v. County of McHenry, 92 Ill. App. 3d 997, 416 N.E.2d 426 (1981) (160-
acre minimum lot farm zoning); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41
(1986) (the use of zoning as a substitute for moral restraints on such uses as adult
bookstores and movies); Ziegler, Trouble in Outer Galactica: The Police Power,
Zoning and Coin-Operated Video-Games, 34 SYRACUSE L. REv. 453 (1983) (zoning
to control teenagers at video arcades). .
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toward "regulating the regulators," w,hen we need· good regulation
rather than the indulgence of planners' daydreams, or local xeno-
phobias, or city councils' efforts to fob off the costs of infrastructure
onto new development. Here, too, the evolution of the regulatory
regime replicates the evolution of property regimes because, from
one perspective, the Court's recent decisions about land regulations
bear a strong resemblance to nineteenth century courts' nuisance
decisions.
Indeed, "takings" doctrine concerning public regulations is a
meta-version of "nuisance" doctrine on private land uses. Like
nuisance adjudications, takings adjudications are post hoc judicial
determinations and are based generally on ordinary practice and
reasonable expectations about which regulatory efforts are fair and
normal, and which are not. As with nuisance law, this post hoc and
ad hoc judicial second-guessing makes possible gradual changes in
the relationship between the regulated and the regulators, and pro-
vides for a change in ordinary regulatory practice-however theoret-
ically unsatisfactory this ad hoc approach may be. 54
What the critics of ad-hocery in "takings" cases may have
overlooked is that the judiciary is not the only player in this game
of "regulating the regulators." In recent years, state legislatures-
sometimes acting under the compulsion of federal environmental
legislation-have been much more active in making the local regu-
lators rationalize their activities and coordinate them with surround-
ing communities.55 Just as the shift from nuisance law to land use
regulation entailed a shift from ex' post adjudication to ex ante
legislation, so new state statutory oversight over local regulation goes
beyond ex post judicial determinations. To replace the vague, nui-
sance-like takings doctrine, these statutes contain ex ante legislative
definitions of the obligations of local regulation. For example, some
state legislation requires that local regulators plan in advance to
accommodate a percentage of the state's low income citizens,56 or
requires that they consider the effects of industrial waste or street
54. See Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Mudd/e,
57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561-62, 596-98 (1984) and literature cited therein (ad hoc,
ordinary language approach of takings jurisprudence). For a recent critique of the
vagaries of "takings," see Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad-Hocery, 88 COLUM. L. REv.
1697 (1989). In the last few years, several commentators have likened takings
jurisprudence to insurance. See, e.g., Fishel & Shapiro, Takings, Insurance and
Miche/man, 17 J. LEG. STUD. 269 (1988). The approach of this article, in treating
takings adjudications as ex post and ad hoc, is compatible with the insurance
rationale, insofar as insurance provides an ex post and ad hoc remedy for harms
whose incidence is uncertain and only imprecisely definable ex ante.
55. See R. HEALY AND J. ROSENBERG, LAND USE AND THE STATES (2d ed.
1979); F. POPPER, THE POLITICS OF LAND-USE REFORM (1981).
56. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65302(c), 65580, 65915, 65008 (West 1983
& Supp. 1990); but see Ellickson, supra note 49.
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-construction or new development-not only inside their own bound-
aries but also on neighboring communities and the larger region and
its resources.~7
Thus as scarcity, competition, and the potential for conflict
increase, we see a dual evolution. An evolution in landed property
took place first, followed by a second and replicative evolution of
the regulation of landed property. The dual evolution might be
represented to look something like this:


















This evolution, of course, does not always progress smoothly and
evenly over time. Indeed, the new takings cases are emerging simul-
taneously with state legislative controls on local regulation. Moreover,
all the kinks have not been worked out of local land regulations
simply because of state legislative oversight. What may be most
interesting, however, is the parallel development, in which state
legislatures are now acting with respect to local boards the way local
boards used to act with respect to private property owners; the state
legislatures define, ex ante, what the local boards can and cannot do
with their regulatory authority. At least some part of this "regulation
of the regulators" is targeting the prevention of externalities that
local regulation might create.
The property rights perspective sometimes appears to argue that
the best way to handle land regulation is to minimize it, and to
adopt a libertarian protection of rights that approximates the land
use rights of the early republic. That is, if you are a land owner,
"anything goes." My own view is that the day for an anything-goes
approach to ownership rights are long gone. The anything-goes
approach was a function of the general plenteousness of land. This
57. See, e.g., Florida's Environmental Land and Water Management Act,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.012 -380.10 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990) (providing for regional
councils to review local development decisions). See also Section 208 of the Federal
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1977) (calling for state areawide planning to
control "nonpoint" water pollution from such uses as construction and agriculture).
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approach is not functional in an age where we live with much more
heated competition over land uses, and when we need some help in
defining rights in a much more detailed way, so that we ·can inter-
nalize the complex externalities that now exist. What we must notice
is that regulatory regimes also evolve in at least some step with
greater scarcity and demand, and that we have to monitor our
regulatory regimes to ensure that they are doing what we require of
them.
I will conclude with an example of why it is important that we
consider the growing scarcity of land-and the attendant emergence
of externalities-when we think about the proper relationship of
property and regulation. Suppose we were to repress public land
controls altogether, and suppose we were to control land ownership
and use by a private rights system. Even if we did so, those exter-
nalities would remain, and landowners would continue to dislike
them. They would not want tires to be burnt next door, and they
might not want the neighbors' trees to block their views. How could
they deal with the difficulties imposed by neighboring land uses? To
handle such difficulties is certainly not impossible; private property
law permits owners to impose restrictions-easements and cove-
nants-on each others' land uses. Many private land use controls are
now in use. Planned communities like condominiums have sheafs of
restrictions-on drapes, paint color, window sizes, dogs and cats,
musical instruments, and so forth. Because these restrictions must be
agreed upon by all the owners subject to them, they are more easily
implemented in new developments, during a time when one developer
owns the whole property and subsequently parcels out units to
purchasers who buy into the whole system. If public land regulation
were to be suppressed, we could expect that residential landowners,
especially in new developments, would employ these kinds of private
land use controls extensively, in order to control the external harms
from neighbors' uses.
An owner's rights under these easements and covenants are
themselves private property rights. If one individual owner wishes
not to abide by the restrictions, she must payoff the other owners,
or otherwise get their agreement to extinguish their rights. From the
perspective of the property rights position, I presume that if a
governmental body wants to extinguish these easement and covenant
rights, it has to compensate the owners too, under the taking clause.
Private land use controls are consequently a genuine alternative
to at least some public controls. The next question is whether they
are preferable. The problem is that occasionally private land restric-
tions impose an unattractive alternative to public controls. These
private restrictions can regulate the living daylights out of the owners,
of course, but any owner who does not like a restriction about paint
colors, setbacks and drapes can presumably buy somewhere else. But
in theory, nothing confines private land use controls to drapes and
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setbacks. They mandate the amount of money you have to spend on
your home, and whether you can have your children live with you.
They might define group homes for the mentally retarded right off
the block, and if it were not for existing public restraints, one
supposes that they could define out Catholics, Jews, and any ethnic
and racial minorities the drafters of such restrictions choose.s8
Does this property rights approach. enhance the cause of individual
autonomy, equality and liberty? Undoubtedly in some ways it does
because it is important to allow groups to set up' common lifestyles
for themselves. These private restrictions, however, are a subject. to
be approached with some caution because they may jeopardize some
other elements of autonomy, equality and liberty-especially when
they are widespread and cannot be avoided without considerable
effort, as with racially restrictive covenants not so long ago. The
point is that even something that looks like a property rights approach
may have implications that we would conventionally call "public."
A private property regime, after all, is a form of regulatory
regime, and it is maintained and paid for by the public at least in
part in order to enhance the welfare of the whole. We are not
choosing property or regulation; we are choosing among regulatory
regimes on property, and we are choosing regulatory regimes at least
in part to induce people to respond with actions that accomplish the
things to which we aspire in our larger common life. This is not a
message of totalitarianism, of Big Brother regulating your property
rights to a meaningless pulp, for some purported public end. Even
if national wealth were not at all important to us, and even if the
central point of a property regime were simply individual autonomy,
people would still need help to arrive at that goal. Part of the help
they need would be in a regulatory regime that encourages their
autonomy. But I expect that even a property rights proponent would
agree that we do not want a property regime that encourages auton-
omy by conflict or the rule of the stronger.
As resources get more scarce, we have to be more concerned
about managing and deflecting conflict, and effectively, that is what
a property regime ought to help us to do. To adhere to all the
conceptions of landownership that we might associate with the Wild
West is not helpful. S9 We do not have such plentiful land or resources
58. This was, of course, the subject of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
see also Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County Servs. Group,
61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1984) (invalidating as against
public policy a covenant that would keep group home for the retarded out of
residential community).
59. Property regimes showed considerable evolution even in the Wild West.
See Anderson & Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American
West, 18 J. L. & ECON. 163 (1975) (evolving property regimes in land, water,
livestock); Umbeck, A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush,
20 J. L. & ECON. 421 (1977) (same for Gold Rush).
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any more, and our private~property-regulatoryregime ought to help
us take account of their greater scarcity-along with the greater
probabilities of conflict-whether it is wealth, autonomy, or some-
thing else that we seek.
Moreover, semi-conscious regulatory regimes that blithely pile all
the burdens on particular landowners, or create problems for other
communities or for outgroup-members, do not achieve goals of either
wealth or autonomy. Instead, they simply constitute another form
of externality,but in this case, the externality comes from the
regulators rather than the property owners. Just as we have had to
move beyond an "anything goes" approach for landowners, so we
now must move beyond "anything goes" for land regulation. The
new takings cases-like the new state and federal oversight statutes-
are an implicit recognition of that point.
